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The outbreak of Covid-19 brought back to the forefront the crucial importance of structural change and 
productive development for economic resilience to economic shocks. Several recent contributions have already 
stressed the perverse relation that may exist between productive backwardness and the intensity of the Covid-
19 socio-economic crisis. In this paper, we analyze the factors that may have hindered productive development 
for over four decades before the pandemic. We investigate the role of (non-FDI) net capital inflows as a potential 
source of premature de-industrialization. We consider a sample of 36 developed and developing countries from 
1980 to 2017, with major emphasis on the case of emerging and developing (EDE) economies in the context of 
increasing financial integration. We show that periods of abundant capital inflows may have caused the 
significant contraction of manufacturing share to employment and GDP, as well as the decrease of the economic 
complexity index. We also show that phenomena of “perverse” structural change are significantly more relevant 
in EDE countries than advanced ones. Based on such evidence, we conclude with some policy suggestions 
highlighting capital controls and external macroprudential measures taming international capital mobility as 
useful policy tools for promoting long-run productive development on top of strengthening (short-term) financial 
and macroeconomic stability. 
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The Covid-19 pandemic has taken a heavy toll on our economies and societies. Such negative 
implications show significant degrees of heterogeneity among countries, not only between 
developed, and emerging and developing economies (EDE henceforth), but also within the EDE 
themselves. Some Asian countries, such as China and Vietnam, have experienced significant 
slowdowns in their growth path, but they have managed to keep on with positive rates of growth 
of their real GDP, while other economies have experienced a significantly negative growth. The 
economic effects of Covid-19 seem to be the hardest in Latin America and South Asia (IMF, 2020a; 
UN, 2021). The prospects of recovery are also much brighter for the advanced economies than for 
most of the EDEs (World Bank, 2021)1. 
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Such heterogeneity may be explained making reference to many factors. First, the countries 
managed the spread of the pandemic in different ways and with different outcomes. Second, also 
their “fiscal spaces” for the implementation of counter-cyclical fiscal policies2 were considerably 
different. Third, the level of productive diversification and development characterizing an economy 
may have played a role both in taming and exacerbating the economic consequences of Covid (Hevia 
and Neumeyer, 2020; IMF, 2020c). Indeed, the regions that have been hit the most by (the economic 
effects of) the pandemic seem to share some common “structural” aspects, which are usually 
attributed to relatively weakly productive economic structures: (i) a larger share of the informal 
sector over GDP; (ii) stronger reliance on services, “contact-intense” and relatively unskilled services 
in particular (i.e., hospitality, tourism, transport, and retail commerce), and/or energy-related 
primary commodities; (iii) lack of diversification towards some high-tech manufacturing industries 
(i.e., electronics and ICT technologies) and/or high-value added tradable services such as finance, 
education and business technology/managerial consultancy. It is perhaps for this reason that 
economic studies and policy making increasingly put emphasis on the leading importance of 
structural change and productive development towards environment-friendly and digital 
economies to achieve sustained and sustainable recovery. 
The pandemic unveiled the negative consequences of productive backwardness and made it 
more urgent to promote structural transformation as part of the response to the crisis. The pursuit 
of sound economic recovery in the context of higher resilience to possible future shocks requires to 
identify the sources of such backwardness. An expanding body of literature has recently tackled this 
issue by presenting evidence of “premature” de-industrialization, particularly in the case of EDE 
countries (Palma, 2005; Tregenna, 2009; Rodrik, 2016; Castillo and Neto, 2016; Tregenna and 
Andreoni, 2020; Dosi et al., 2021). According to Rodrik (2016), in the last three decades most EDE 
economies - with the noteworthy exception of East Asian countries -  have been experiencing a 
remarkable contraction in the contribution of manufacturing to both total employment and real and 
nominal GDP. This contraction has started much earlier (in terms of both economy-wide 
development and manufacturing development specifically) than what one would have expected by 
looking at the historical experience of advanced economies3.  
Despite detecting widespread phenomena of “premature” de-industrialization, the literature 
does not go deeper in exploring the possible sources of such structural transformation. Our 
contribution aims at filling this gap by empirically identifying some possible causes of premature de-
industrialization4. More specifically, our work brings together two streams of analysis that have 
 
2 See IMF (2020) for an overview of the considerable differences in fiscal policy responses to Covid-19 between 
developed countries and EDE economies, and among EDE economies themselves. 
3 The central role of manufacturing for a broader development process of advanced economies can be certainly 
reconducted to the theoretical contributions of Nicholas Kaldor (1967), among many others. In line with a Kaldorian 
perspective, albeit manufacturing might have partially exhausted its pro-growth properties in developed countries, it 
seems to still play a strategic role in EDE countries (see Szirmai, 2012). On top of this, it is also worth stressing the 
relevant synergies and complementarities that seem to exist between manufacturing and the development of high-
value added and high-skill intensive business services (see Meliciani and Savona, 2015). In a way, manufacturing 
development can be considered as a pre- or concurrent condition for the development of those tradable services that 
may have enabled a few EDE countries to cushion / mitigate the economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. In this 
sense, our prime (but not exclusive) attention to manufacturing is motivated by the far-reaching consequences that 
premature de-industrialization can have on productive development.       
4 To be fair, some authors have identified different modalities of the Dutch Disease as a key source of premature de-
industrialization (see, for instance, Palma, 2014; Ocampo, 2011; Guzman et al., 2018; Cimoli et al., 2020, among others). 
In some cases, capital account liberalization and international capital flows are indicated as possible causes for such 
regressive structural change. However, this hypothesis has not been tested rigorously. This paper tries to expand this 
argument by measuring the impact of different periods of financial bonanza on the productive structure of the host 
economies. We go beyond the implications for (relative importance of) the manufacturing sector as such, and we also 
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rarely been connected so far. On the one hand, we make reference to above-mentioned literature 
on structural change, productive development, and premature de-industrialization. On the other 
hand, we look at the literature about the macroeconomic effects of large capital inflows over the 
recipient economies. In doing this, we try to analyze whether periods of large net capital inflows 
(portfolio investment and international credit in particular), i.e., periods of financial “bonanza”, 
contribute to explain episodes of premature de-industrialization and setbacks in the broader 
process of productive development, here measured by the economic complexity index (ECI). Our 
study covers a wide range of countries. We consider both developed and EDE economies for which 
enough data are available, in particular BoP financial data. Our attention, however, is primarily on 
the second group of countries. Indeed, one corollary of our analysis is the attempt to detect 
possibly different long-term productive effects of periods of financial bonanza over EDE countries 
with respect to the developed ones. 
The purposes of this paper are manifold. First, we empirically show that periods of large net 
capital inflows, surges in portfolio investments, and international credit more specifically may have 
potentially detrimental effects on the productive development of the recipient economies. Second, 
we show that such effects are considerably stronger in EDE countries than in the advanced 
economies. Third, we illustrate that this finding holds true for various measures of industrialization 
and productive development, being them captured by either manufacturing contribution to 
employment and economic activity, or by the ECI index. The term “manufacturing” hides a 
significant degree of heterogeneity5, which we attempted to correct by including the ECI as an 
alternative proxy for capabilities. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and scrutinizes the several 
mechanisms through which, from a theoretical point of view, periods of large capital inflows may 
affect the long-run productive development of the host economies. It also discusses the few 
empirical works that, so far, have investigated the possible relation between surges in capital flows 
and long-run productive developments. Section 3 consists of our empirical analysis. It explains the 
methodology used in this work by defining periods of “large” capital inflows, the sample of countries 
under analysis, and the estimation strategy adopted. Finally, it describes the results of our study. 
Based on our empirical results, Section 4 proposes some policy suggestions, arguing that external 
macro-prudential policies aimed at restraining capital inflows and improving macroeconomic 
stability may also foster long-run productive development. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Financial bonanza, structural change and premature de-industrialization: A review of 
theoretical and empirical literature. 
 
2.1 Capital inflows, structural change and productive development: A theoretical framework  
 
The literature on the causal relation between capital flows and growth in EDE countries is quite 
abundant. Moreover, economists seem to agree that surges in capital inflows, perhaps stimulated 
by financial liberalization reforms, tend to heighten macroeconomic instability (Taylor, 1998; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Ocampo et al., 2008; Perez Caldentey and Vernengo, 2021), with 
rather little benefits in terms of faster growth (Ostry et al., 2016). Finance-led short-run fluctuations 
 
look at the effects on the economic complexity index as a proxy for changes in the technological capabilities of the 
economy (see more on this below). 
5 See Dosi et al., (2020), who use the traditional Pavitt typology to highlight the differences in the behavior of the various 
branches of the manufacturing sector all along the overall development process, and Tregenna and Andreoni (2020), 
who show that the greater the technological intensity of manufacturing, the less concave its pattern of development 
will be, with a seemingly less pronounced de-industrialization dynamics.  
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may well extend to medium/long-run dynamics if financial and currency turbulences (or full-fledged 
crises) emerge from enduring balance-sheet imbalances. Frequently, the outcomes are permanent 
output losses and slack economic recoveries (Cera and Saxena, 2008, Koo, 2014). 
Relatively less attention has been paid to whether capital inflows, short-term volatile portfolio 
investment and international credit in particular “shape” long-run macroeconomic dynamics by 
changing the productive structure of the recipient economies. Whilst some contributions already 
shed some light of this point (see Palma, 2014; Ocampo, 2011; Guzman et al., 2018; Cimoli et al., 
2020), very few works have formally modeled or, more importantly, econometrically analyzed what 
Benigno and Fornaro (2014) have labelled as the “financial” resource curse, and Botta (2017, 2021) 
defines as the financial Dutch disease. 
For instance, Lartey (2008) and Benigno and Fornaro (2014) present supply-side growth models 
where large access to foreign capitals may give rise to consumption booms and Dutch disease-like 
phenomena by increasing the (relative) price of non-tradable goods versus tradable ones. In Lartey 
(2008), capital inflows de facto boil down to foreign-made investment goods used as productive 
inputs in the production of domestic manufactured products. Because of this, Lartey (2008) largely 
ignores the financial and monetary aspects of international capital movements (i.e., the 
determination of domestic and international interest rates and of the spread between them, as well 
as the connected determination of the nominal and hence real exchange rates) that may also bear 
significant consequences in terms of productive development. Benigno and Fornaro (2014) model 
episodes of large capital inflows as reductions in the exogenously given interest rate characterizing 
small open economies. This will in turn encourage larger international borrowing, widening current 
account deficits and consumption booms in the home economy. Adjustments in the economy 
mainly take place via changes in relative prices in the context of an optimizing inter-temporal 
traverse towards the long-run equilibrium. Once again, the model does not pay attention to real-
economy implications of the financial mechanisms related to (short-term) speculation in different 
sectors, financial instability, and the determination of financial variables in domestic and 
international financial markets. 
Botta (2017, 2021) complements these two papers by focusing on the financial mechanisms at 
the basis of (or, at least contributing to) finance-led processes of de-industrialization, measured by 
reductions in the relative importance of manufacturing. Botta (2017) shows how surges in portfolio 
investment and international credit, as originally induced by natural resource booms, may fuel 
Dutch disease by causing a stronger (temporary) appreciation of the nominal and real exchange 
rate, heightening exchange rate volatility, and depressing long-term investment in the tradable 
sectors in particular. Botta (2021) describes how periods of financial euphoria may affect the relative 
incentives to invest in speculative sectors, say real estate, rather than in manufacturing by boosting 
expected returns of the former with respect to the latter. When cumulative causation and path-
dependence characterize the dynamics of labor productivity in manufacturing, a temporary 
(relative) squeeze of manufacturing may become permanent and throw (EDE) economies in a low-
growth trap6. 
Figure 1 below gives a comprehensive overview of the many different channels through which 
periods of large capital inflows may influence the structural productive dynamics of an economy. 
 
6 Taylor (1991, ch.6) presents a structuralist model capturing the economic consequences of financial bubbles and 
speculative waves in countries such as Kuwait in the 1980s and Chile in the second half of the 1970s. He states that 
financial booms have a very poor connection, if any, with the development of the non-traditional non-commodity 
tradable sector, say manufacturing, but stronger linkages with the (over-) expansion of the financial industry and/or the 
real estate. Taylor (1991) does not place foreign capitals at the center of his analysis, as for him financial booms unfold 
via internal mechanisms. Nevertheless, he explicitly admits that foreign capitals can play a relevant role in triggering or 
feeding financial booms. 
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Some of these mechanisms have been highlighted in the works just mentioned. Some others appear 
as side effects of broader (finance-led) phenomena of credit booms, exchange rate cycles and, 
eventually, Minskyan instability that have usually attracted the attention of a wider audience of 
economists. 
The first channel portrayed in the upper part of Figure 1 captures the “Dutch disease-like” effect 
of large capital inflows. It consists in the evolution of the sectorial composition of an economy, away 
from manufacturing and towards non-tradable services, that surges in portfolio inflows and 
international credit may bring about. These surges affect the nominal and real exchange rate and, 
therefore, the price competitiveness of home-made goods and services. At least in the short-
medium term, say in the expansionary phase of a financial cycle, abundant international capitals 
may feed domestic credit booms and the expansion of the economy. Relative prices move in favor 
of non-tradable goods and services7. The real exchange rate appreciates and productive factors find 
more profitable to move away from “non-traditional” tradable sectors (read manufacturing) 
towards non-tradable ones. Although financial booms may not last long and even be followed by a 
reversal, “perverse” structural changes may become permanent in cases of widening – sometimes 
irreversibly - technological and productivity gap (Botta, 2021). 
 
Figure 1 – Large capital inflows and structural change: a theoretical overview 
 
         
The nominal exchange rate is not only a component of the real exchange rate and of relative 
prices between imported and home-made goods. It is also the “financial price” that determines the 
domestic currency equivalent of foreign currency-denominated assets and liabilities. The “financial 
side” of the nominal exchange rate plays a fundamental role in causing changes in the balance 
 
7 The asymmetric effects of (international) credit-led domestic expansions over prices in different sectors may be due 
to the fact that, in small open economies, prices of tradable goods and services are at least partially determined in the 
international markets rather than by internal/domestic economic mechanisms.   
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sheets of firms with a currency mismatch between foreign currency-denominated liabilities and 
domestic currency-denominated assets. Since 2010, this is increasingly the case of companies in EDE 
economies (Chui et al., 2016; Perez-Caldentey et al., 2019). Against this backdrop, the appreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate caused by booming capital inflows makes the balance sheet of 
domestic firms more solid. This, in turn, may induce them to raise investment, not only because the 
price of imported capital goods declines, but because a stronger balance sheet may allow them to 
scale up purchases of new vintage capital equipment. This is the second channel reported in Figure 
1. This channel is potentially beneficial for long-run productive development, if higher investment 
helps to fill the technology gap and to introduce process and product innovation that may support 
the strategic integration of the economy in the international goods market. 
Albeit potentially positive, channel 2 may be the consequence of the booming phase of a 
Minskyan financial cycle, in the case of EDE countries in particular (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2009). A 
perverse destabilizing feedback between surges in capital inflows, the accumulation of foreign debt, 
and the exchange rate dynamics should be mentioned. During periods of financial “bonanza”, 
relatively cheap and abundant international liquidity may induce domestic companies to issue large 
amounts of corporate bonds in international markets (see again Chui et al., 2016; Perez-Caldentey 
et al., 2019). From a balance sheet point of view, the increase in the external liabilities of domestic 
companies is mirrored in the rise of capital inflows8. These may cause a (temporary) appreciation of 
the exchange rate, which reduces the burden of foreign debt and may encourage domestic 
companies to get even more indebted in international financial markets. Very frequently, this 
positive feedback does not last long. Most likely, it sets the stage for an abrupt reversal. When 
conditions in international financial markets become less favorable or “intolerance” against 
allegedly excessive external debt mounts (Reinhart et al., 2003), international capitals stop flowing 
in. As a consequence, the exchange rate depreciates and the debt burden becomes unsustainable. 
Financial turmoil, exchange rate crises and economic recession may eventually “knock at the door” 
of the economy all together. In this context, the above-mentioned increase in (productive?) 
investment may be short-lived. It may actually concur in generating “speculative” or “Ponzi” 
positions at the micro level. At the macro level, perverse externalities can be observed in cases of 
fragile financial positions, as the latter pave the way for the burst of the bubble and cause an 
enduring drop in investment (when firms try to deleverage from accumulated debt) that more than 
compensates for the initial increase (see the central block of Figure 1). Over the medium-to-long 
run, what initially appeared as a positive contribution to productive development may turn into a 
negative shock, as higher macroeconomic instability and uncertainty reduce the investment rate. 
Path dependence and hysteresis phenomena give rise to persistent effects in terms of productive 
and technological backwardness (Cimoli et al., 2013).  
Surges in foreign capital inflows have frequently fueled credit booms in developing and emerging 
economies. Credit booms may in turn affect the productive dynamics of the economy according to 
the different industries that benefit the most from the expansion of credit opportunities. Easy credit 
that prevalently finances investment in the non-traditional tradable good sector can likely lead to 
different long-term development implications with respect to credit bubbles inflating the non-
tradable sector, say real estate. We hereby stress the importance of the sectorial pattern of (foreign 
capital-led) increases in credit to the private sector through channel 4 at the bottom part of Figure 
1.  
 
8 Portfolio capital inflows may also take the form of investment in equities. This type of capital inflows may contribute 
to temporary appreciations of the domestic currency, with possible consequences for the structural (sectorial) evolution 
of the home economy, as much as foreign investment in debt instruments. However, the implications in terms of 
financial solidity and debt sustainability are different, as equity purchases do not provide foreign investors with the 
“privileges” accorded to creditors.    
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Sectoral patterns of investment may play a relevant role not only because of its direct effect on 
the evolution of the productive structure of the economy, but also because it may feed back onto 
the financial position of domestic firms by increasing (or not) currency and/or maturity mismatches 
in their balance sheets. On the one hand, we can associate a reduction in the currency mismatch 
and a more solid financial position of domestic companies to foreign capital-financed investment by 
companies in the tradable sector that may increase their external competitiveness and lead to a rise 
in export. On the other hand, if foreign capital mainly fuels companies in the non-tradable sector, 
the currency mismatch will increase, as well as the exposure to external shocks. Which sector(s) 
get(s) most of the funds made available in the economy is a vital aspect for the short-medium-term 
stability and long-term development implications of financial integration and foreign capital booms. 
Since surges of capital inflow appreciate the real exchange rate and tend to favor non-tradable over 
tradable sectors, they are more likely to aggravated currency mismatches.  
 
2.2 Capital inflows, structural change and productive development: The empirical literature 
 
There are very few empirical works that rigorously test the theoretical contributions mentioned in 
section 2.1. In some cases, these works regard country case studies that provide an anecdotal, often 
implicit, description of how surges in international capital inflows may have affected the sectorial 
composition of recipient economies. A few other works present more elaborated empirical or 
econometric analyses. 
Taylor (1998), for instance, describes the unstable macroeconomic dynamics characterizing 
several EDE economies in the aftermath of the wave of financial liberalization between the end of 
the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. In doing so, he identifies the significant connection 
between large capital (speculative) inflows, episodes of financial euphoria and hypertrophic real 
estate sectors in Mexico and Thailand. In the case of Mexico, he notes that easy access to 
international finance enabled credit to housing to increase by 1000 percent in a few years, whilst 
productive investment barely recovered above 20 percent of GDP from the slump of the lost decade 
in the 1980s. In a similar vein, Moreno-Brid and Ros (2004) observe that short-term capital inflows 
were combined with rapid trade liberalization by the end of the 1980s, leading to a major external 
crisis in 1994. The initial investment spur could not be sustained, and growth and investment 
remained at low levels since the 2000s. 
Gallagher and Prates (2014) analyze the growing importance of financial investors (via 
speculation in the derivative market) to determine commodity prices and exchange rate dynamics 
in Brazil in the first decade of the 2000s. In their view, the interplay between large inflows of 
(speculative) capitals and the commodity boom may have exacerbated the resource curse and the 
process of premature de-industrialization undergone by the country. Botta et al. (2016), in turn, 
provide empirical evidence of finance-led structural changes in Colombia. In this case, initial 
increases of FDIs in natural resources attracted booming portfolio inflows that caused even stronger 
appreciations of the Colombian peso and a statistically significant squeeze in the contribution of 
manufacturing to domestic GDP. Cimoli et al., (2020) look at Brazil and Argentina in a comparative 
perspective with respect to South Korea and China. They show that periods of RER appreciation, 
particularly those associated with capital inflows in the 1970s and 1990s, led to a process of 
structural change in which technology-intensive sectors lose ground in the productive structure. 
With a broader focus on the whole Latin American region, Perez Caldentey and Vernengo (2021) 
argue that premature de-industrialization in Latin America intertwines with premature 
financialization, as booming returns in the financial sectors have characterized the region since the 
mid-1990s, while the rates of exports, GDP and capital accumulation have steadily declined. 
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Benigno et al. (2015) and Bortz (2018) provide more general empirical evidence about the effects 
of large capital inflows on the productive structure of recipient economies9. Bortz (2018) shows that 
there is a positive correlation between the increase in gross capital inflows towards some EDE 
countries and the variation in the contribution to GDP of the financial, real estate and commerce 
sectors. Benigno et al. (2015) consider a sample of 70 high-middle income countries and analyze the 
sectorial reallocation of productive inputs (i.e., sectorial employment and investment shares) during 
periods of large capital inflows, as proxied by historically large current account deficits. They find 
that periods of net capital inflows bonanza are associated to the squeeze - at least in relative terms 
- of manufacturing.  
The empirical findings of Benigno et al. (2015) may implicitly complement the evidence about 
premature de-industrialization put forward by Rodrik (2016). In the economies with a higher degree 
of financial integration, an early and/or more intense (than expected) contraction of the 
manufacturing shares might be partially due to the long-term structural effects of large capital 
inflows. The present paper tries to explicitly integrate and expand these streams of literature. On 
the one hand, we aim at verifying whether large capital inflows may be considered statistically 
relevant causes of cases of premature industrialization that Rodrik (2016) identifies but leaves 
unexplained. On the other hand, with respect to Benigno et al. (2015), we take into account more 
direct measures of capital inflows and we look at the specific role played by portfolio investment 
and international credit, instead of considering “undistinguished” capital inflows, which also include 
FDIs. We present the details and novel contributions of our empirical analysis in section 3 below. 
 
3. Financial bonanza, structural change and premature de-industrialization: An empirical 
investigation 
 
3.1 Rationale of the study 
 
Following Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997) and Palma (2005), the productive structure of an 
economy usually changes throughout the broader development process. In the early stages of 
development, an increasing share of the labor force relocates from agriculture to industry, in 
particular manufacturing. The share of manufacturing increases both in terms of total employment 
and GDP. At more advanced stages, however, the service sector expands both in absolute and in 
relative terms. The share of manufacturing contracts giving rise to an inverted U-shaped trajectory. 
This is the (expected) de-industrialization phase of the whole development process, which Tregenna 
(2009) identifies with the joint reduction in the contribution of manufacturing to total employment 
and (nominal) GDP10. Given such “fundamental” forces, premature de-industrialization takes place 
in developed countries if the decline in the economy-wide importance of manufacturing is more 
pronounced than expected. In a similar vein, premature de-industrialization can be observed in EDE 
countries when the share of manufacturing starts to contract earlier than expected, i.e., at a lower 
 
9 Other studies have focused their attention on the effects of international resource transfers on productive 
development. Acosta et al. (2009), for instance, analyze the possible Dutch disease-like effects of international 
remittances. Rajan and Subramanian (2011) study the role of international aid. All these studies and this paper agree 
that transfers of international resources and/or capital movements may affect the long-run productive development of 
recipient economies beyond the short- and medium-run macroeconomic dynamics. Nonetheless, with the exception of 
more traditional Dutch disease argument, the mechanisms investigated in this work are different with respect those 
studied in other contributions.    
10 Statistical evidence about de-industrialization is far less evident if one takes data about manufacturing GDP share in 
real terms. The contribution of manufacturing to real GDP is more stable through time once it reaches the peak, and 
the subsequent decline is far smaller. This stylized fact could be possibly explained by the difficulties in the computation 
of sectoral deflators, as well as the different dynamics in the prices of tradable and non-tradable goods.    
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level of per-capita GDP (or at a lower “peak” of the manufacturing share itself) with respect to the 
historical experience of the advanced economies.  
In an influential paper published in 2016, Rodrik (2016) finds evidence of premature de-
industrialization for a wide sample of developed and EDE countries between 1980 and 2010. He 
introduces period-specific dummy variables in a regression analysis featuring per-capita GDP and 
the size of population, both in squared terms, as “fundamental” variables that capture 
manufacturing share’s inverted U-shaped trajectory over time. Rodrik’s analysis is certainly useful 
to detect cases of premature de-industrialization, yet it does not provide any explanation or does 
not identify any specific cause behind such phenomenon. Benigno et al. (2015) discuss some of 
these causes when they found a statistically significant positive relationship between periods of 
large capital inflows and the allocation of productive inputs, labor and capital investment, away 
from manufacturing.  
We merge and develop further these two lines of analysis. First, we develop Rodrik’s study by 
expanding his econometric model and including some additional factors that may explain premature 
de-industrialization. Periods of large capital inflows (see more about this below) are at the core of 
our analysis. In addition to this, we also verify if our findings are robust to alternative measures of 
productive development. Rodrik (2016) focuses on the dynamics of the manufacturing shares to 
GDP and employment over time, whereas we extent the set of possible dependent variables to the 
ECI index, which to some extent may provide a broader measure of productive (and technological) 
development. Second, unlike Benigno et al.,(2015) we look at direct data about (some types of) 
capital inflows. Benigno et al., (2015) use data about current account deficits - adjusted for 
variations in foreign reserves - as indirect measures of net total capital inflows, i.e., both portfolio 
investment, international credit and FDI. We use direct data about private sectors’ portfolio 
investment and international credit only, thus excluding FDIs and foreign reserves from our analysis. 
The reasons are threefold. First, our purpose is to investigate whether the supposedly most volatile 
components of capital flows can also bear long-term effects for productive development in addition 
to their most acknowledged short/medium term implications for macroeconomic stability. Hence 
our focus on portfolio investment and international credit. Second, we do not consider FDIs, since 
they are likely to follow different motives and behave in a different fashion with respect to more 
speculative capital inflows (see Krugman (2000), for instance)11. On top of this, the study of the long-
run effects of speculative capitals is a largely unknown “territory” that may deserve more attention, 
whilst it is rather straightforward to expect FDI to play a role in the structural dynamics of recipient 
economies. Third, we do not consider changes in foreign reserves, as they may be the result of 
discretional policy measures taken by domestic monetary institutions rather than of the behavior 
of the “private” actors we are primarily interested in (although economic actors’ decisions can 
certainly be influenced by the accumulation of foreign reserves and/or sterilization measures). 
 
11 While the distinction between portfolio investment and greenfield FDI is somehow clear, the case of brownfield FDI 
is more complicated. In theory, similar speculative motives may in fact drive some brownfield FDIs as they do with 
portfolio capital inflows, so that our notion of volatile and speculative capital inflows might be extended to also include 
brownfield FDI. On the one hand, lack of disaggregated data about FDI largely impede to distinguish brownfield FDI from 
greenfield FDI and to merge the former with portfolio investment and international credit. On the other hand, Krugman 
(2000) coined the expression “fire-sale” FDI in order to describe FDI behaving in a somehow counter-cyclical fashion 
and in opposite way with respect to portfolio capital inflows and international credit. According to Krugman (2000), FDI 
inflows are more stable and may actually increase during crises, in order to take advantage of the possibility of 
purchasing and taking control of domestic companies at lower prices than in periods of economic booms. This is 
particularly the case of brownfield FDI. The more recent empirical evidence about countercyclical FDI is not undisputed, 
with some contributions confirming Krugman’s hypothesis (Aguiar et al., 2005; Acharya et al., 2011), whilst others go in 
the opposite direction (Stoddard and Noy, 2015). For all these reasons, we preferred to exclude all types of FDI from 




From a technical point of view, our analysis is based on a sample of 36 countries, including both 
developed, emerging and developing economies. Our sample significantly overlaps with Rodrik’s 
with the exception of six countries (Ethiopia, Malawi, Morocco, Taiwan, West Germany and Zambia), 
for which updated data are not available either for the dependent variables or the financial 
explanatory ones. Our dataset covers the period from 1980 to 2017. Table A.1 in the Appendix 
presents the full list of countries included in our study. Table A.2provides the sources of our data 
and descriptive statistics. We take most of data from the updated Groningen Growth and 
Development Center (GGDC) dataset or international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank 
(WB) and ECLAC. Data about the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) are taken from the Atlas of 
Economic Complexity12. 
Before implementing our estimations, we run a battery of tests about the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence in our data. The results of our 
tests are reported in Table A.3. Pearson test suggests that our data are not characterized by cross-
sectional dependence, while heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation are observed. For this reason, 
we implement our analysis by using an Ordinary Least Square Panel Corrected Standard Error (OLS-
PCSE) estimator in order to properly take into account these features. 
As discussed, we try to capture the possible relation between periods of large capital inflows and 
cases of premature de-industrialization by expanding Rodrik’s (2016) regression model (without 
period-specific dummies) and including additional explanatory variables, finance-related variables 
first and foremost, beyond those “structural” factors (i.e., GDP per capital and population) capturing 
the “fundamental” inverted U-shaped dynamics of manufacturing shares. This is formally stated in 
Equation (1) below: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑔𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽8𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑅 +  𝜖𝑖,𝑡   (1) 
 
In Equation (1), 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 stands for the various dependent variables we use to measure industrial 
development and, more broadly, the degree of technological and productive complexity 
characterizing an economy. In line with Rodrik (2016), we first consider the share of manufacturing 
over total employment (manemp) and over GDP, both in nominal (nommanva) and real terms 
(realmanva). We then use the ECI index as originally computed by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) as 
an alternative proxy for productive and technological development.  
On the right-hand side of equation (1), 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is the level of real per-capita GDP. 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is the level 
of population. Unlike Rodrik (2016), we do not take natural log transformations of these variables, 
in order to maintain consistency with the other explanatory factors included in our analysis.  
𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝐹𝐼𝑁stands for “our” financial variable. We construct 𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝐹𝐼𝑁 as a dummy variable that takes value 
1 during periods of large capital inflows (and 0 otherwise). Following Benigno et al., (2015), we 
identify episodes of large capital inflows as periods characterized by “unusually” high levels of net 
non-FDI capital inflows rather than by marked changes in their dynamics (see Reinhart and Reinhart 




12 The ECI index depends - among other factors - on the degree of sectorial diversification characterizing the economy. 
This influences the extent by which the economy may develop comparative advantages in a wide range of industries or 
not. Following Imbs and Warzciag (2003), countries tend to follow an inverted U-shaped pattern of diversification along 
the overall development process. The ECI index may display a similar evolution and to some extent mimic the process 
of industrial development described by Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997).     
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Definition: episodes of large capital inflows are periods during which: (i) net non-FDI capital inflows 
are not negative or equal to zero; (ii) they show positive values for at least three years consecutively; 
(iii) the sub-period average is higher than the full-period country-specific average adjusted 
(increased) by ten percent of one standard deviation. 
 
As in any “event identification-based” analysis, our definition of large capital inflows is somehow 
discretional. Yet, the three criteria just mentioned present some useful properties. First, they 
emphasize periods of large capital inflows that extend beyond the very short run and that may be 
long enough to generate enduring consequences for the productive economic structure. In a way, 
our definition may help exclude isolated spikes in international capital inflows that may hardly have 
any structural economic implication. Second, it tends to select periods of time characterized by 
“internal” patterns or consistency with financial markets’ “conventions” about recipient economies, 
i.e., capital flows are relatively stable and do not abruptly switch from positive to negative values. 
Third, it may take in due account countries’ peculiarities by paying attention to country-specific 
averages and variability. Forth, our definition seems to be able to capture all the major episodes of 
large capital inflows already tracked by the economic literature for the set of countries at stake (e.g., 
financial booms in Latin America and Asia in the 1980s or 1990s, as well as pre-2007 large capital 
inflows to peripheral eurozone countries). 
We construct the financial dummy variable  𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝐹𝐼𝑁 based on net rather than gross capital inflows. 
Empirical data suggest in fact that  net capital inflows have been more volatile than gross figures13 
from 1980 to 2017. This can be explained by the pro-cyclical nature of international financial 
transactions involving domestic capitals, particularly in EDE countries. At the start of a financial 
boom, positive foreign capital inflows are amplified by the (at least partial) repatriation of domestic 
capitals that were previously invested abroad. Symmetrically, the outbreak of financial turmoil may 
reduce gross foreign capital inflows and encourage domestic capitals to leave the country in search 
for safer foreign assets. Within the theoretical framework portrayed in Figure 1, heightened 
financial volatility is one way through which international capital movements can affect the 
productive development of an economy. We try to capture this aspect by taking the most volatile 
measure of capital inflows. 
Along with the financial variable and those set forth by Rodrik in his regression analysis, equation 
(1) also includes a series of additional control explanatory variables. 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝑖𝑚𝑝) 𝐺𝐷𝑃⁄  
measures the degree of trade openness characterizing an economy. It is defined as the ratio of 
exports (exp) plus imports (imp) over GDP. 𝑔𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊, in turn, is the rate of growth of the Rest of the 
World (ROW). Finally, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑅 is the share of natural resource rents over GDP as measured by Lange et 
al., (2018). By using these control variables, we seek to capture the effects of other forces that 
contribute to shape the pattern of specialization, besides liquidity cycles in the international 




Based on the methodology described in the previous section, we identify 60 episodes of large capital 
inflows from 1980 to 2017. They are listed in Table A.4 in the Appendix. We also include periods of 
time that fall shorter than a three-year span, but are part of well-known episodes of large capital 
inflows that started before 1980 and that would conform to our definition if considered in their 
entirety (see Argentina 1980-1981, for instance). Tables 1 – 4 below report the results of our 
 
13 If we take standard deviation (SD) as a synthetic measure of volatility in capital flows, SD characterizing net non-FDI 
capital inflows towards EDE countries is equal to 7.82 for data from 1980 to 2017. It is considerably higher than the 
corresponding statistics for gross non-FDI capital inflows, which is equal to 3.64.   
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regression analysis. Table 1 looks at manufacturing employment share. Tables 2 and 3 pay attention 
to nominal and real manufacturing GDP share, respectively. Table 4 puts emphasis on the ECI index. 
We estimate equation (1) for the full sample, as well as for developed and EDE countries considered 
separately. 
Our results replicate Rodrik’s findings on structural factors (GDP per capita and population) that 
account for the “natural” process of de-industrialization. More relevantly, Tables 1 – 4 show a 
negative causal relation between periods of large capital inflows and our measures of productive 
development. When net non-FDI capital inflows are particularly abundant, the manufacturing share 
tends to contract and the economic complexity index decreases. Large net non-FDI capital inflows 
may become a source of premature de-industrialization or declining productive complexity, in the 
sense of a lower degree of diversification and a loss of comparative advantages in high-skill intensive 
productive sectors.  
The negative correlation between periods of large capital inflows and productive development 
is statistically significant in all our “full sample” regressions (column (1) in Tables 1 – 4), with the 
exception of the estimations related to the real manufacturing GDP share (realmanva). In this case, 
the coefficient associated to the financial dummy variable remains negative as expected, but is 
statistically insignificant. This result is consistent with Rodrik’s findings and the general 
acknowledgement of far less solid evidence for de-industrialization when the focus is on the real 
manufacturing GDP share. 
When we do a separate analysis for the advanced and EDE economies, clear evidence is found 
that the long-term detrimental effects of large capital inflows are more serious in the latter than in 
the former. EDE countries always experience statistically significant contractions (at least at 10% 
confidence level) in the manufacturing employment share, in the manufacturing nominal GDP share 
and in the economic complexity index when net non-FDI capital inflows stand at “higher than 
normal” levels (column (2) in Tables 1, 2 and 4). Such a negative effect seems to be particularly 
strong in the case of the economic complexity index. Consistent with the economic theory outlined 
in Figure 1, large net non-FDI capital inflows may fuel and feed the expansion of non-tradable 
sectors rather than (non-traditional) tradable ones. They may also lead to protracted periods of 
appreciation of the nominal and real exchange rate. These facts may in turn harm EDE countries’ 
capabilities to compete in international goods market for manufactured products and cause a 
premature decline in the degree of complexity (and diversification) characterizing their economies.  
As for developed countries, the coefficient associated to the financial dummy variable becomes 
statistically insignificant in the case of the manufacturing employment share (see column (3) in Table 
1). It turns into positive, albeit statistically insignificant, in the case of manufacturing nominal GDP 
share (column (3) in Table 2). The financial dummy variable continues to display a statistically 
significant (at 10% confidence level) negative correlation with the economic complexity index even 
in the advanced economies (column (3) in Table 4). Nonetheless, the size of this effect is 
approximately half of reduction observed in EDE economies14. 
Among the other explanatory factors included in our analysis, the coefficient associated to the 
natural resource variable is always negative, as expected. However, it is statistically insignificant in 
most of the estimations. Remarkable exceptions are the negative correlation with the 
manufacturing employment share when we consider the full set of countries and, more importantly, 
with the ECI index. In this last case, such a negative correlation becomes statistically significant (and 
 
14 This may be explained by the fact that developed countries are specialized in sectors characterised by a less concave 
or, in some cases, even convex pattern of evolution of the manufacturing share over time, as shown by Tregenna and 
Andreoni (2020) and Dosi et al. (2021). Being these sectors more technologically advanced, they would represent a pull 
factor for foreign investors, as their liabilities (even the short-term ones) would be deemed as safe assets and/or a 
benchmark for more complex financial products (i.e., ETFs). 
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larger in size with respect to the full sample regression) in the specific case of EDE economies. The 
results thus show the relevance of having a measure of capabilities that goes beyond the share of 
manufacturing in GDP or employment. 
We also run an additional battery of regressions considering alternative measures of the “natural 
resource curse” variable for the EDE economies. We consider the share of natural resource sectors 
over GDP and the weighted price index of exported commodities15. In both cases, results (not 
presented here but available on request) are in line with and reinforce those already discussed. 
Larger dependence on natural resources, whatever measure we take, always gives rise to sizable 
and statistically significant negative effects over our indicators of productive development. The only 
exception is the coefficient associated to the exported commodity price index in the regressions for 
the real manufacturing GDP share. In this case, the estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant 
and gets very small counter-intuitive positive values16. 
The main econometric analysis of this work is based upon the construction of a financial dummy 
capturing periods of financial bonanza. We can measure the economic relevance of our statistical 
results by computing the semi-elasticity of the four different dependent variables reported in Tables 
1 – 4 with respect to the financial dummy itself. In the case of the full sample, semi-elasticity values 
range from a minimum of -0.0035 for manufacturing contribution to real GDP to a maximum of -
0.021 for the economic complexity index. In the specific case of EDE economies, all values increase, 
ranging from -0.0081 (for the manufacturing real GDP share) to -0.03 (for manufacturing nominal 
GDP). Semi-elasticity values associated to EDE countries’ manufacturing employment share and ECI 
index are equal to -0.021 and -0.022, respectively. During periods of financial bonanza, EDE 
economies experience a 2-3 percent extra reduction in the contribution of the manufacturing sector 
to either employment or nominal GDP with respect to its expected trend dynamics. The reduction 
in the degree of economic complexity is in the order of 2.2 percent. Perhaps more importantly, such 
economic outcomes may become even more relevant over the long run, since that finance-led 
(relative) contractions in manufacturing or in the degree of economic complexity may become 
irreversible and can hardly be reverted during periods of “modest” capital inflows (Cimoli et al., 
2020). Regressive structural changes due to recurrent episodes of surges in capital inflows can thus 
cumulate through time.         
 
15 Weights are given by the share of each single commodity over total commodity exports. 
16 In line with channel 2 in Figure 1, this result somehow reflects the positive (but transitory) influence of an 
improvement in EDE countries’ terms of trade over imports of critical capital goods for the expansion of manufacturing.    
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Table 1 – Econometric estimations for manufacturing employment share (manemp), 1980 – 2017. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000616*** 0.000876*** -0.000641*** 
 (5.29e-05) (6.51e-05) (8.92e-05) 
GDP per capita, squared -1.00e-08*** -2.01e-08*** 4.40e-09*** 
 (1.09e-09) (1.81e-09) (1.17e-09) 
Population -4.82e-06* 3.37e-07 2.43e-05*** 
 (2.46e-06) (2.65e-06) (8.24e-06) 
Population, squared 0*** 0 -9.43e-11*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Financial boom dummy -0.253** -0.235* -0.0667 
 (0.114) (0.122) (0.184) 
Trade Openness 0.00657* 0.00381 0.0166*** 
 (0.00366) (0.00490) (0.00305) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.00126 0.00121 0.00226 
 (0.0102) (0.00873) (0.00917) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.0183 -0.00124 -0.000676 
 (0.0186) (0.0197) (0.189) 
Constant 8.218*** 6.430*** 31.92*** 
 (0.566) (0.475) (1.706) 
    
Observations 896 647 249 
R-squared 0.789 0.763 0.941 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 








Table 2 – Econometric estimations for manufacturing nominal value-added share (nommanva), 1980 – 2017. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000215*** 0.000584*** -0.000587*** 
 (5.85e-05) (0.000124) (0.000134) 
GDP per capita, squared -4.87e-09*** -1.82e-08*** 4.70e-09*** 
 (1.07e-09) (3.85e-09) (1.74e-09) 
Population 4.92e-06 1.25e-05** 2.11e-05* 
 (4.80e-06) (5.11e-06) (1.12e-05) 
Population, squared 0 -0 -1.30e-10*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Financial boom dummy -0.392*** -0.576*** 0.227 
 (0.142) (0.167) (0.258) 
Trade Openness 0.00923** 0.00980 0.0104** 
 (0.00465) (0.00724) (0.00421) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.0195* 0.0186 0.0280** 
 (0.0106) (0.0126) (0.0138) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.0554* -0.0492 -0.0648 
 (0.0292) (0.0316) (0.226) 
Constant 18.19*** 15.75*** 34.28*** 
 (0.900) (0.969) (2.552) 
    
Observations 888 639 249 
R-squared 0.748 0.737 0.920 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 3 – Econometric estimations for manufacturing real value-added share (realmanva), 1980 – 2017. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000192*** 0.000764*** -0.000334*** 
 (5.43e-05) (0.000108) (0.000107) 
GDP per capita, squared -2.84e-09*** -1.92e-08*** 3.65e-09*** 
 (1.09e-09) (3.59e-09) (1.39e-09) 
Population -1.40e-06 5.58e-06 3.22e-05*** 
 (4.73e-06) (4.49e-06) (1.09e-05) 
Population, squared 0* 0 -1.73e-10*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Financial boom dummy -0.0644 -0.142 -0.0480 
 (0.101) (0.134) (0.255) 
Trade Openness 0.00382 -0.00129 0.0115*** 
 (0.00467) (0.00594) (0.00321) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.0140** 0.0144 0.0267** 
 (0.00715) (0.00879) (0.0127) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.00427 -0.00721 -0.272 
 (0.0156) (0.0202) (0.190) 
Constant 15.90*** 13.09*** 24.55*** 
 (0.733) (0.801) (2.029) 
    
Observations 894 648 246 
R-squared 0.756 0.764 0.898 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 







Table 4 – Econometric estimations for Economic Complexity Index (ECI), 1980-2017. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.00221*** 0.00219*** 0.000583** 
 (8.63e-05) (0.000199) (0.000268) 
GDP per capita, squared -2.28e-08*** -3.62e-08*** -4.17e-09 
 (1.60e-09) (6.04e-09) (3.30e-09) 
Population 1.85e-05*** 3.10e-05*** 0.000110*** 
 (6.47e-06) (6.24e-06) (3.03e-05) 
Population, squared -0 -0*** -3.80e-10*** 
 (0) (0) (9.53e-11) 
Financial boom dummy -1.135*** -1.032*** -0.489* 
 (0.305) (0.354) (0.281) 
Trade Openness -0.0159** 0.0404*** -0.0225** 
 (0.00663) (0.0135) (0.00897) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.00150 0.000841 -0.00600 
 (0.0263) (0.0282) (0.0199) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.256*** -0.307*** -0.138 
 (0.0894) (0.0882) (0.297) 
Constant 33.89*** 30.24*** 66.68*** 
 (1.232) (1.465) (5.234) 
    
Observations 896 648 248 
R-squared 0.904 0.846 0.972 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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In order to verify the robustness of our findings, we re-run the regression model specified in 
Equation (1) by directly using data on non-FDI capital inflows (as a percentage of GDP) instead of 
our “constructed” financial dummy variable. Our goal is to ascertain that the construction of the 
financial dummy variable does not generate any bias in the results reported in Tables 1 – 4. Tables 
5 – 8 below present the outcomes of the robustness check. They provide further support to our 
analysis and confirm the hypothesis that large capital inflows may bear negative structural 
consequences in terms of productive development and economic complexity.  
In Tables 5 – 8, the regression coefficients of the net non-FDI capital inflows are always negative. 
If we restrict our focus to the regressions for the full sample of countries and for EDE economies, 
such negative correlation is statistically significant in all cases except for the manufacturing 
employment share. Differently from the previous findings, it turns weakly significant (at 10% 
percent confidence level) even in the case of the real manufacturing GDP share. In the case of 
developed economies, the coefficient for net non-FDI capital inflows is always insignificant (albeit 
negative). Importantly, these results are also obtained when the ECI index is used as dependent 
variable. This is an important difference with respects to estimations including the financial dummy 
variable. 
Tables 5 – 8 also confirm our findings related to the role of natural resources for whichever 
“natural resource curse” variable we use. The higher the rents “extracted” from the exploitation of 
natural resources, the lower is the contribution of manufacturing to either GDP or total 
employment, as well as the economic complexity index. This negative relation is statistically 
significant for nominal manufacturing GDP share and for complexity index in the “full sample” 
regression and in the case of EDE economies. 
The economic implications of the regression coefficients reported in Tables 5 – 9 are broadly 
similar and consistent with those described before. If we only focus on EDE countries, the estimated 
elasticity with respect to non-FDI net capital inflows range from -0.0013 in the case of the 
manufacturing employment share to -0.0064 for manufacturing nominal GDP share. Elasticity 
related to both manufacturing real GDP share and ECI index is similar and equal to -0.0050 and -
0.0057, respectively. Whilst these values may seem quite small and irrelevant, they have to be 
combined with sizable increases in international capital inflows during periods of financial bonanza.  
The same can be said when considering the significantly smaller order of magnitude of changes in 
the productive structure and/or in the technological level of an economy, usually in the order of a 
few percentage points over a relatively long-time span. For example, periods of financial bonanza 
in EDE countries could lead net non-FDI capital inflows to increase by almost 7 times with respect 
to periods of “financial tranquility” (from 0.7 percent of GDP to 5.6 percent). Accordingly, surges in 
capital inflows could lead EDE countries’ manufacturing contribution to nominal GDP to decrease 
by about 4.4 percent (= -0.0064*6.89). Their level of economic complexity can decline by almost 4 
percent (= -0.0057*6.89). Estimated changes in EDE countries’ manufacturing employment and real 
GDP shares are equal to -0.8 percent and -3.4 percent, respectively.  
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Table 5 – Robustness check for manufacturing employment share (manemp) using net non-FDI capital inflows, 1980 – 2017. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000604*** 0.000804*** -0.000614*** 
 (5.28e-05) (7.10e-05) (7.86e-05) 
GDP per capita, squared -9.76e-09*** -1.80e-08*** 4.07e-09*** 
 (1.09e-09) (1.88e-09) (1.02e-09) 
Population -5.62e-06** -9.46e-07 2.46e-05*** 
 (2.71e-06) (3.63e-06) (7.23e-06) 
Population, squared 0*** 0 -9.29e-11*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Net non-FDI capital inflows (% of GDP) -0.0150 -0.00468 -0.0199 
 (0.00992) (0.00656) (0.0125) 
Trade Openness 0.00658* 0.00176 0.0174*** 
 (0.00371) (0.00488) (0.00252) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.000288 0.000418 0.00141 
 (0.00934) (0.00662) (0.0107) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.0166 -0.00187 -0.115 
 (0.0176) (0.0163) (0.214) 
Constant 8.300*** 6.939*** 31.50*** 
 (0.583) (0.535) (1.480) 
    
Observations 896 647 249 
R-squared 0.786 0.728 0.936 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 








Table 6 – Robustness check for manufacturing nominal value-added share (nommanva) using net non-FDI capital inflows, 1980 – 2017. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000242*** 0.000451*** -0.000548*** 
 (5.55e-05) (0.000125) (0.000131) 
GDP per capita, squared -5.13e-09*** -1.57e-08*** 4.39e-09*** 
 (1.02e-09) (3.64e-09) (1.70e-09) 
Population 3.06e-06 1.41e-05** 2.12e-05* 
 (4.61e-06) (5.89e-06) (1.11e-05) 
Population, squared 0 -0 -1.32e-10*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Net non-FDI capital inflows (% of GDP) -0.0386*** -0.0337*** -0.0207 
 (0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0152) 
Trade Openness 0.00836* 0.0183** 0.0108*** 
 (0.00450) (0.00772) (0.00411) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.0193* 0.0161 0.0267* 
 (0.0114) (0.0108) (0.0142) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.0552* -0.0557* -0.124 
 (0.0304) (0.0297) (0.228) 
Constant 18.06*** 15.81*** 33.66*** 
 (0.888) (1.043) (2.492) 
    
Observations 888 639 249 
R-squared 0.761 0.703 0.920 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 7 – Robustness check for manufacturing real value added share (realmanva) using net non-FDI capital inflows, 1980 – 2017. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000234*** 0.000758*** -0.000328*** 
 (4.83e-05) (0.000102) (0.000113) 
GDP per capita, squared -3.67e-09*** -1.88e-08*** 3.63e-09*** 
 (9.85e-10) (3.40e-09) (1.46e-09) 
Population -2.87e-06 5.40e-06 3.17e-05*** 
 (3.94e-06) (4.72e-06) (1.12e-05) 
Population, squared 0** 0 -1.73e-10*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Net non-FDI capital inflows (% of GDP) -0.0246** -0.0246* -0.00765 
 (0.120) (0.0133) (0.0137) 
Trade Openness 0.00296 -5.87e-05 0.0117*** 
 (0.00431) (0.00592) (0.00343) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.0152* 0.0141* 0.0239* 
 (0.00816) (0.00856) (0.0122) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.0108 -0.00726 -0.201 
 (0.0181) (0.0195) (0.176) 
Constant 15.87*** 13.05*** 24.43*** 
 (0.689) (0.795) (2.133) 
    
Observations 894 648 245 
R-squared 0.775 0.764 0.903 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 







Table 8 – Robustness check for Economic Complexity Index (ECI) using net non-FDI capital inflows, 1980-2017. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000121*** 0.000117*** 3.36e-05** 
 (4.51e-06) (9.81e-06) (1.24e-05) 
GDP per capita, squared -1.24e-09*** -1.87e-09*** -2.04e-10 
 (8.23e-11) (2.86e-10) (1.53e-10) 
Population 8.80e-07** 1.55e-06*** 5.77e-06*** 
 (4.05e-07) (4.28e-07) (1.31e-06) 
Population, squared -0 -0* -0*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Net non-FDI capital inflows (% of GDP) -0.00489*** -0.00526*** -0.00163 
 (0.00146) (0.00165) (0.00127) 
Trade Openness -0.000728* 0.00237*** -0.00146*** 
 (0.000375) (0.000718) (0.000396) 
ROW GDP growth rate -3.36e-05 -6.82e-05 -0.000667 
 (0.00144) (0.00153) (0.00124) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.0137*** -0.0154*** -0.00957 
 (0.00488) (0.00468) (0.0176) 
Constant -0.979*** -1.168*** 0.777*** 
 (0.0691) (0.0776) (0.250) 
    
Observations 895 648 247 
R-squared 0.651 0.432 0.872 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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The figures relative to developed countries are generally smaller. This is both due to somehow 
smaller values of estimated elasticity, as well as to relatively more stable net non-FDI capital 
inflows17. Surges in capital inflows could lead economic complexity to decrease by about 1.3 percent 
(= -0.0033*4.35), about one-third of that observed in EDE economies. If we look at the 
manufacturing real GDP share, the estimated extra decline is about 1.5 percent (= -0.0036*4.35), 
less than one-half of the same estimated change for developing and emerging economies.     
 
4. Large capital inflows and productive development: implications for capital control and external 
macroprudential policy 
 
The previous analysis brings strong support to the claim that controls on capital movements (in 
particular capital inflows in periods of bonanza) might be an important tool not only in the quest for 
macroeconomic stability, but also to promote structural change and resilience in laggard 
economies. These findings reinforced the growing consensus on the importance of management 
policies on capital flows (Ostry et al., 2012; Klein, 2012), especially when such flows are dominated 
by volatile portfolio investment and international credits (Ostry et al., 2016). Financial bonanza is a 
critical factor in spurring premature de-industrialization and compromising any progress towards a 
more sophisticated productive structure, thereby heightening the vulnerability of the economy to 
exogenous shocks, such as those recently experienced with the pandemic. 
The empirical evidence about the effectiveness of these measures gives mixed results. Klein 
(2012) tends to downgrade the role of capital flows management (CFM) policies, i.e., the broad 
policy category to which capital controls and external macroprudential regulation pertain18. Other 
contributions present different findings. Ostry et al., (2012) argue that CFM policies do not change 
the overall amount of gross capital inflows. Yet, they modify their composition away from debt 
instruments, reduce the relevance of FX-denominated credit in domestic lending, and ultimately 
strengthen domestic financial solidity. Forbes et al., (2015) reach similar conclusions by stressing 
that CFM policies may not prevent surges in capital inflows and exchange rate appreciations, but 
they can tame domestic credit booms and reduce domestic financial fragility. Ahnert et al., (2021) 
note that CFM tends to reduce financial sector and aggregate economy-wide exposure to exchange 
rate risk, even though this is partially moved to the non-financial corporate sector. Erten and 
Ocampo (2016) present empirical evidence according to which CFM policies can effectively restrain 
booms in capital inflows and mitigate macroeconomic instability once the problem of endogeneity 
is duly considered19. 
It is not possible to discuss all the empirical evidence about the relation between CFM policies 
and macroeconomic and financial instability. Yet, the empirical evidence showcased in this study 
possibly suggests two ways for CFM policies to generate long-term sectorial consequences.  They 
 
17 In the case of developed countries, net non-FDI capital inflows tend to increase by about 4 times (from 2.68 percent 
to 14.34 percent of GDP) during periods of financial bonanza with respect to “tranquil” times.  
18 Following Ostry et al., (2012), capital control measures look at the residency of economic actors as “discrimination” 
criteria for limiting financial transactions between them. On the contrary, external FX-related macroprudential 
regulation may restrict the accumulation of certain financial assets or liabilities depending on the currency in which they 
are denominated, regardless of the residency of the actors involved. Although the two set of policies are conceptually 
different, they de facto overlap with each other in relation to the goals they pursue (ex: reducing financial instability 
caused by external borrowing in foreign currency); the variables they influence (ex: the exchange rate and foreign 
indebtedness); the phenomena they attempt to control (ex: domestic credit booms fueled by foreign capitals). This 
explains why they are both included in the general CFM toolkit.  
19 While CFMs policies may influence capital inflows, they often emerge as endogenous policy responses to surges in 
foreign capitals themselves. Overlooking this issue of endogeneity might generate a downward bias in the estimated 
effects of the former over the latter.    
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are shown in Table 9 below, a list of specific CFM measures along with their targeted variables and 
goals.  
First, it is crucial to look at the link between surges in capital inflows, the accumulation of foreign 
reserves and monetary policy independence. Since the beginning of the 2000s, increasing concern 
about foreign capital-led appreciations in the nominal and real exchange rate has pushed many 
countries, especially EDE economies, to accumulate large amounts of foreign reserves (Levy Yeyati, 
2010; Akyüz, 2014). Such accumulation of foreign reserves may enable countries to better control 
the exchange rate and prevent exchange rate crises. However, this comes with a cost. Following 
Akyüz (2021), recycling foreign reserves by investing them in “safe” assets in the centers of the 
global financial system may give rise to a negative income transfer from EDE countries to developed 
economies due to differences in the yields on their foreign investments. Furthermore, when 
accumulating foreign reserves, domestic monetary authorities expand domestic liquidity. This may 
avoid the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, but domestic inflation may accelerate and lead 
to an uncompetitive real exchange rate. In this case, the accumulation of foreign reserves may prove 
rather ineffective to avoid the crowding-out of non-traditional tradable sectors resulting from real 
exchange rate appreciations. Alternatively, domestic monetary institutions may sterilize excess 
liquidity by selling domestic bonds in open market operations. However, yields on domestic public 
bonds will increase, and the space for expansionary fiscal policy will narrow, reducing public 
investment and the possibility to crowd-in private investment and feed structural change. 
Following Erten and Ocampo (2016), CFM policies may discourage external borrowing in foreign 
currency and weaken the pressure on the appreciation of the nominal and real exchange rate. 
Domestic monetary authorities would therefore be able to take milder positions in the FX market, 
reduce average holding of foreign reserves, and avoid the adoption of sterilization measures. 
Following Rey (2018), this makes domestic monetary policy more independent from global financial 
cycles. On top of this, a CFM-led reduction in the scale of international capital inflows may facilitate 
the adoption and implementation of managed exchange rate regimes (Obstfeld et al., 2018), which 
seem to perform better than fixed and free-floating regimes in reducing the sensitivity of domestic 
credit and housing prices to global financial shocks (see Obstfeld et al., 2018). They may also soften 
the “original sin redux” and dwindle foreign investors’ reactions to swings in the exchange rate 
(Hofmann et al., 2021) by dampening exchange rate volatility itself. More relevantly, domestic 
monetary authorities may gain wider margins of maneuver to pursue “developmentalist” 
objectives, once the exposure to global financial shocks has been reduced. National strategies for 
post-Covid sustainable recovery might benefit of more independent monetary policies that can 
accommodate the implementation of publicly financed recovery plans, prioritizing public 
investment, public (social and physical) infrastructures and, eventually, structural change20. 
Second, the design of CFM measures should explicitly take onboard the sectorial effects of large 
capital inflows by paying attention to the sectors that are mostly affected by inflows of foreign 
funds, either directly via foreign investors’ purchases of home securities or intermediated by the 
domestic financial system. For the sake of productive development, the effects of foreign funds are 
considerably different depending on their destination: they can fuel housing booms in the domestic 
real estate sector; finance the expansion of the domestic service sector or support productive 
investment in the non-traditional (e.g., non-natural resource) tradable sector. As a consequence, 
CFM policies should impose different restrictions to foreign capitals depending on the sector. Let us 
take the example of (non-interest bearing) deposit requirements or direct taxes levied on foreign 
borrowing. On the one hand, these measures should become tighter when foreign debt is 
 
20 In this sense, our policy recommendations take inspiration from Ocampo (2011), when he stresses how 
macroeconomic policies should adopt a broader perspective by aiming at smoothing economic cycles and counter-
acting crisis with the final goal of promoting productive development.  
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denominated in foreign currency. On the other hand, they should foresee and apply tougher 
“penalty” rates on foreign borrowing by corporations in the non-tradable sector with respect to 
companies operating in the non-traditional tradable sector. Similarly, given the foreign currency-
denominated debt of the domestic banking system, macroprudential policy should discriminate 
against credit to non-tradable industries and favor bank’ loans to those activities that have the 
potential to generate “hard currency” revenues. 
The purpose of sector-specific CFM measures is twofold. First, additional restrictions imposed at 
sectorial level may further concur to reduce economy-wide currency mismatches and mitigate 
financial instability. Second, they go beyond the general claim to avoid excessive external borrowing 
and focus more on the allocation of collected funds, with the aim of creating a more diversified 
technologically advanced productive system with stronger export capacity. Industry-specific CFM 
measures explicitly try to counteract the decline in tradable activities that large capital inflows may 
prompt via Dutch disease-like mechanisms. Moreover, they acknowledge the fact that the 
accumulation of technological knowledge and the diversification of the productive system may be 
the ultimate necessary conditions for macroeconomic stability (Chang and Lebdioui, 2020), 
translating these considerations into policy agenda. From an historical point of view, it is not by 
chance that stronger export orientation and more advanced industrialization in East Asia than in 
Latin American made the former mostly immune to the external debt crisis of the 1980s (Sachs, 
1985), and/or quicker in post-crisis recoveries thereafter. The latter, instead, was at the epicenter 
of the crash in 1982 and has continued to suffer from more acute recurrent financial and economic 
instability since then.
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Table 9 – Economy-wide and sector-specific CFM policy measures  
ECONOMY-WIDE HORIZONTAL MEASUES 
MEASURE TARGET VARIABLE MAIN PURPOSE 
Quantitative limits to external 
borrowing 
External debt/own fund ratio  1. Tame Minskyan cycles 
Debt service ratio 2. Reduce "foreign currency pressure" 
  3. Create more leeway for FX control and autonomous monetary policy 
SECTOR-SPECIFIC MEASURES 
MEASURE TARGET VARIABLE MAIN PURPOSE 
Sector-specific reserve requirements 
on foreign borrowing 
Relative costs of foreign borrowing 1. Contrast Dutch disease effects of capital inflows 
2. Direct external funding towards non-traditional tradable sectors 
3. Discourage overexpansion of non-tradable sectors 
4. Reduce currency mismatch 
Sector-specific taxation of portfolio 
capital inflows 
Financial returns/capital gains 1. Squeeze returns/capital gains on short-term investment  
2. Tame stock exchange/real estate bubbles 
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5. Conclusion                                 
 
The economic effects of Covid-19 have been particularly harsh in those EDE countries, characterized 
by poorly diversified productive structures, large informal sectors, high dependence on exports of 
natural resources or participation in the low-skill stages of global value chains, and where countries 
have failed to develop a skill-intensive service sector. Any national strategy for post-Covid sustained 
and sustainable recovery should put structural change and productive development at the core of 
its agenda. For the successful implementation of such plans, it is therefore necessary to identify 
sources of productive and technological backwardness.  
In this paper, we document the perverse effects that non-FDI net capital inflows may have on 
the prospect of structural change towards more technology-intensive sectors. Based on a previous 
study by Rodrik (2016), we provide empirical evidence suggesting that large capital inflows may 
cause premature de-industrialization and technological backwardness.  Periods of high financial 
liquidity in the international economy have a negative impact on the technological intensity of a 
country, measured either by the share of the manufacturing sector to GDP or employment or by the 
degree of economic complexity of the domestic productive systems. Moreover, these negative 
impacts are particularly acute in the case of emerging and developing (EDE) economies with respect 
to developed countries. 
 The findings of our study provide further support to the widening consensus that CFM measures, 
i.e., capital controls and external macroprudential policies, can contribute to improve the economic 
performance and financial stability of an economy, particularly in EDE countries. The positive effects 
of CFM policies go beyond an increased short-term resilience to global financial shocks. They also 
help counteract Dutch disease-like phenomena triggered off by large non-FDI net capital inflows, as 
they help reduce the implicit costs of large foreign reserves’ holdings, facilitate the adoption of 
managed exchange rate regimes (allowing to keep it more stable at a competitive level), and 
increase the degree of independence of domestic monetary policy from global financial cycles. By 
limiting excessive external borrowing and, at the same time, favoring a “virtuous” allocation of funds 
towards new export activities and away from the non-tradable sectors (imposing industry-specific 
restrictions to foreign borrowing), they open space to combine key macroeconomic prices (the 
interest rate and the real exchange rate) with industrial and technological policies, with dedicated 
attention to the acceleration of economic diversification in laggard economies. 
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Table A.1 – List of countries included in the regression analysis 
COUNTRY COUNTRY CODE SUB-SAMPLE 
Argentina ARG Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Bolivia BOL Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Botswana BWA Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Brazil BRA Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Chile CHL Emerging and developing (EDE) 
China CHN Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Colombia COL Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Costa Rica CRI Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Denmark DNK Developed 
Egypt EGY Emerging and developing (EDE) 
France FRA Developed 
Ghana GHA Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Honk Kong HKG Emerging and developing (EDE) 
India IND Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Indonesia IDN Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Italy ITA Developed 
Japan JPN Developed 
Kenya KEN Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Malaysia MYS Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Mauritius MUS Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Mexico MEX Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Nigeria NGA Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Netherlands NLD Developed 
Philippines PHL Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Peru PER Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Senegal SEN Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Singapore SGP Developed 
South Korea KOR Emerging and developing (EDE) 
South Africa ZAF Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Spain ESP Developed 
Sweden SWE Developed 
Tanzania TZA Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Thailand THA Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Venezuela, RB VEN Emerging and developing (EDE) 
United Kingdom GBR Developed 




Table A.2 – Data source and descriptive statistics, full country sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SOURCE LABELS N mean sd max min 
       
IMF (IFS) and Cepalstat Non-FDI net capital inflows 940 4.602 8.630 146.4 -19.64 
IMF (IFS) and Cepalstat Financial dummy 940 
    
GGDC Manufacturing Employment Share 1,296 13.62 6.019 41.20 1.231 
GGDC Manufacturing Nominal Value Added 1,287 19.78 6.948 38.00 1.070 
GGDC Manufacturing Real Value Added 1,283 17.52 6.439 32.49 1.087 
Atlas of Economic 
Complexity 
Economic Complexity Index (ECI) 1,290 56.01 19.42 100 0.501 
GGDC Population 1,296 116,657 256,320 1.380e+06 1,340 
GGDC Population, squared 1,296 7.926e+10 3.074e+11 1.905e+12 1.795e+06 
GGDC GDP per capita 1,296 14,757 13,097 67,331 699.2 
GGDC GDP per capita, squared 1,296 3.892e+08 6.058e+08 4.533e+09 488,919 
WB Trade openness index 1,255 71.90 71.70 442.6 6.320 
WB ROW GDP growth rate 1,252 5.769 5.409 24.66 -6.990 
WB Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) 1,287 5.050 6.252 37.29 0.000311 
       
Number of years  1980-2017 1980-2017 1980-2017 1980-2017 1980-2017 














Table A.3 – Econometric tests for autocorrelation, heteroskedaticity and panel data cross-sectional dependence. 















      
Woolridge test for 
serial 
correlation 
H0: no first-order 
autocorrelation 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
(rejected) 







Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob > chi2 = 1.0000 
(not rejected) 
      
Modified Wald 
statistic for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity 
H0: no groupwise 
heteroskedasticity 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
      
Pearson test for Cross-
sectional 
dependence 
H0: no cross-sectional 
dependence 
Pr = 0.475               
(not rejected) 
Pr = 0.466               
(not rejected) 
Pr = 0.466               
(not rejected) 
Pr = 0.485               
(not rejected) 
      
      








Table A.4 – Periods of large capital inflows 
EPISODE 
NUMBER 
CODE COUNTRY TIME SPAN 
EPISODE 
NUMBER 
CODE COUNTRY TIME SPAN 
 
1 ARG Argentina 1980 - 1981 31 JPN Japan 2014 - 2017  
2 ARG Argentina 1991 - 1998 32 KEN Kenya 2012 - 2016  
3 ARG Argentina 2006 - 2012 33 MEX Mexico 1990 - 1994  
4 BOL Bolivia 1992 - 1994 34 MEX Mexico 2007 - 2017  
5 BOL Bolivia 1996 - 1998 35 MYS Malaysia 2009 - 2013  
6 BOL Bolivia 2001 - 2005 36 NLD Netherlands 1997 - 2006  
7 BOL Bolivia 2008 - 2017 37 NGA Nigeria 2005 - 2015  
8 BWA Botswana 2001 - 2003 38 PER Peru 1994 - 1997  
9 BWA Botswana 2006 - 2009 39 PER Peru 2002 - 2007  
10 BRA Brazil 1991 - 1998 40 PER Peru 2010 - 2017  
11 BRA Brazil 2005 - 2015 41 PHL Philippines 1992 - 1995  
12 CHL Chile 1980 - 1982 42 PHL Philippines 2002 - 2006  
13 CHL Chile 1992 - 1994 43 SEN Senegal 2013 - 2015  
14 CHL Chile 1997 - 2014 44 SGP Singapore 1993 - 1996  
15 CHN China 2000 - 2002 45 SGP Singapore 2001 - 2007  
16 CHN China 2005 - 2007 46 KOR South Korea 1994 - 1996  
17 COL Colombia 1980 - 1985 47 KOR South Korea 2001 - 2007  
18 COL Colombia 1994 - 2001 48 KOR South Korea 2010 - 2014  
19 COL Colombia 2009 - 2017 49 SWE Sweden 1995 - 2011  
20 CRI Costa Rica 2002 - 2008 50 ZAF South Africa 1994 - 2000  
21 CRI Costa Rica 2010 - 2017 51 ZAF South Africa 2004 - 2007  
22 DNK Denmark 1999 - 2010 52 ZAF South Africa 2009 - 2014  
23 FRA France 1998 - 2009 53 ESP Spain 1998 - 2007  
24 IDN Indonesia 1993 - 1996 54 THA Thailand 1993 - 1997  
25 IDN Indonesia 2005 - 2013 55 THA Thailand 2005 - 2007  
26 IND India 2001 - 2005 56 GBR United Kingdom 1995 - 2001  
27 IND India 2009 - 2014 57 GBR United Kingdom 2003 - 2007  
28 ITA Italy 1994 - 2000 58 USA United States 1995 - 2007  
29 ITA Italy 2003 - 2006 59 VEN Venezuela 1990 - 1994  
30 JPN Japan 2004 - 2007 60 VEN Venezuela 1997 - 2011  
 
 
